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Abstract
In almost all countries supply, distribution and use of cannabis is pro-
hibited. Nevertheless, cannabis is the most popular illicit drug. Prohi-
bition does not seem to work. The debate on legalization of cannabis is
often emotional with strong views of both proponents and opponents
but ignorance prevails. There are supposedly detrimental health eects
of cannabis use but researchers debate whether they are causal or mere
associations. As long as nowhere in the world cannabis is legalized it
is dicult to get a clear idea about the eects of legalization. Rather
than muddling through for several decades it would be wise to start
moving on the long and winding road to cannabis legalization.
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11 Introduction
Although some countries have quasi-legalized cannabis use (the Nether-
lands), made cannabis available for medical purposes (California) or al-
lowed the growing of a small number of cannabis plants for personal use
(Australia), in most countries (the Netherlands included) cannabis supply,
distribution and use is prohibited (Reuter, 2010). Nevertheless, in 2009,
between 2.8% and 4.5% of the world population aged 15-64, corresponding
to between 125 and 203 million people had used cannabis at least once in
the past year (United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime, 2011).
Table 1 presents cannabis use statistics for a number of countries, dis-
tinguishing between lifetime use (ever), recent use (last year) and current
use (last month). The range in lifetime use is substantial from a low 21% in
Sweden to a high 42% in the United States. The range in recent cannabis
use is also substantial from a low 1% in Sweden to a high 14% in Italy. Fi-
nally, current use ranges from 1% in Sweden to 7% in Spain and the United
States. What is also striking is the big dierence between lifetime use and
recent use. In the Netherlands for example 25% of the population aged 15
to 64 has ever used cannabis but only 7% has done so in the last year. Ap-
parently, for a substantial part of the users, cannabis is not very addictive
(see also Van Ours, 2006 for details).
Clearly, prohibition does not work. Cannabis is the most popular illicit
drug. The debate on legalization of cannabis gains momentum. Caulkins
et al. (2011) mention seven motivations for creating a legal cannabis mar-
ket: raising tax revenues, eliminating arrests, undercutting black markets
and associated harms from corruption and violence, redirecting criminal jus-
tice resources, assuring product quality, increasing choices for those seeking
intoxication and limiting youth access by better control. The legalization
debate is often emotional with strong views of both proponents and oppo-
nents. Those who are in favor of legalization tend to ignore the negative
health eects of cannabis use. Those who are against legalization ignore the
fact that legal substances such as alcohol and tobacco also have bad health
eects (Hall and Lynskey, 2009).
The current paper discusses empirical evidence on cannabis use, the
2health eects of cannabis use and the implication for legalization of cannabis
use. The paper is set-up as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
legalization debate. Section 3 presents the main characteristics of cannabis
policy in the Netherlands. Section 4 discusses characteristics of cannabis
use, while section 5 deals with eects of cannabis use on its users. Section
6 concludes.
2 Legalization debate
There is no direct empirical evidence of the eects of legalization of cannabis
on its use or its users. The evidence is indirect and based on out of sample
predictions.
2.1 Theoretical models
The legalization of cannabis has been studied in a few theoretical papers.
Becker et al. (2006) present a model which assumes full competition and
thus zero expected prots. The fact that some drugs suppliers make huge
prots has to do with the ex post position that they were not caught. Becker
et al. show that under some conditions law enforcement aiming at quan-
tity reduction is inferior to a policy regime under which drugs are legalized
and taxed. They argue against Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) who claim that
quantity reductions are easier to implement than price increases through tax,
because illegal activities are easier to detect than not paying taxes. The ar-
gument by Becker et al. is that enforcement costs may be very high. An
interesting argument of Becker et al. is also that with inelastic demand for
drugs, more enforcement reduces consumption but increases drug revenues
implies that more resources are available for drug smuggling. Poret (2003)
presents a multi-layer model of the drugs market with trackers, retailers,
dealers and consumers. He considers the drugs market to be an oligopoly
and shows that under some conditions an increase in law enforcement may
reduce consumer prices.1
1This might occur for example when trackers internalize the increased risk retailers
run by reducing the wholesale price.
32.2 California Proposition 19
According to Kilmer et al. (2010) California has always been on the cutting
edge of cannabis policy reform. In 1975, California reduced the maximum
sentence for possessing less than an ounce (28.35 grams) of cannabis from
incarceration to a small ne. In 1996, California allowed cannabis to be
grown and consumed for medical purposes. California currently has over a
thousand medical marijuana shops. In November 2010 California voted on
whether cannabis should be legalized and taxed. The Californian proposi-
tion on the 2010 ballot { the Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act, also
known as Proposition 19 { would have fully legalized cannabis with respect
to the Californian state law.2
Pacula (2010) argues that the debate on cannabis legalization in Cali-
fornia is dominated by worries about health consequences as one-fth of all
treatment admissions in the state is due to marijuana use. An increase in
cannabis use may also cause an increase in health expenditures which will
be paid through taxes. So a priori it is not clear that there will be a net
tax reduction when cannabis is legalized. However, she concludes that it is
unlikely that a rise in the known health harms would lead to a large enough
cost to taxpayers to o-set the revenue gain from legalizing and taxing {
assuming that taxes are actually paid and not evaded. Kilmer et al. (2010)
provide estimates of the possible eects of legalizing cannabis in California.
Taking into account that their estimates have unknown condence intervals
they nd that pretax retail price of cannabis will go down a lot, likely by
more than 80 percent. The eect on consumer prices will depend on taxes
but it is likely that consumption will go up. Tax revenues will increase but
it is virtually impossible to indicate by how much. The savings on enforc-
ing cannabis laws are also dicult to indicate. Caulkins et al. (2012) take
Proposition 19 as their inspiration to discuss legalization design choices: the
level of taxes and whether taxes should depend on cannabinoid levels, rules
on home cultivation, advertising restrictions and design adjustments over
time. The legalization design choices Caulkins et al. (2012) discuss are im-
2It would not have prevented federal prohibition action. In theory, federal agents can
take over low-level enforcement but in practice federal prosecutors would probably only
deal with large quantities of cannabis.
4portant. Taxes should be suciently high to discourage cannabis use and
suciently low to drive out illegal supply. Furthermore, taxes should depend
on cannabinoid levels, home cultivation should be allowed under restrictions
and advertising should be banned. The most important design choice of
legalization is the exibility to adjustment, allowing for learning by doing.
Proposition 19 was narrowly rejected with 53.5% of the voters voting
against the proposal.
3 The Dutch example
The Netherlands have a cannabis policy that is closest to being legal al-
though cannabis supply and distribution are prohibited and in fact also use
is not legal but decriminalized. The main aim of Dutch drug policy is to
protect the health of individual users, the people around them and society as
a whole. Regulations on drugs are laid down in the Opium Act, which draws
a distinction between hard drugs and soft drugs. Hard drugs are those sub-
stances which can seriously harm the health of the user and include heroin,
cocaine an synthetic drugs such as ecstasy. Soft drugs, i.e. the cannabis
derivatives, marijuana and hashish cause far fewer health problems. The
possession of hard drugs is a crime. However, since 1976 the possession of a
small quantity of soft drugs for personal use is a minor oense.
The expediency principle is applied to the sale of cannabis in \coee-
shops" in order to separate the users' market for hard and soft drugs and
keep young people who experiment with cannabis away from hard drugs.
The sale of small quantities of soft drugs in coee-shops is therefore tech-
nically an oense, but prosecution proceedings are only instituted if the
operator or owner of the shop does not meet certain criteria. These cri-
teria are that no more than 5 grams per person may be sold in any one
transaction, no hard drugs may be sold, drugs may not be advertised, the
coee-shop must not cause any nuisance, no drugs may be sold to persons
under the age of 18, which may not be admitted to the premises. The mayor
may order a coee-shop to be closed.
By allowing controlled use of soft drugs, the markets for soft drugs and
hard drugs are separated. The idea is that strict prohibition of soft drugs
5would stimulate the black market and lead soft drugs users into hard drug
use. So, controlled use avoids soft drugs to become a stepping-stone for
hard drugs. According to MacCoun (2011) the Dutch coeeshop system
may have been responsible for separating the soft and hard drug markets
and rather than increasing the gateway from soft to hard drug use may have
reduced this gateway (see also Van Ours, 2003). According to Reuter (2010)
commercialization of sale in the Netherlands may have led to an increase in
consumption but the increased access has not led to the Dutch population
showing higher than average rates of cannabis use or longer cannabis use
careers. Korf (2002) indicates that the use of cannabis in the Netherlands
shows trends that are very similar to those in other European countries that
did not decriminalize cannabis.
Coeeshops were absent until the middle of the 1970s. Then their num-
ber increased rapidly to reach a maximum of about 1500 across the Nether-
lands in the early 1990s. In the past decade the number of coeeshops went
down. The evolution of the number of coeeshops in the Netherlands is pre-
sented in Figure 1. As shown, in the past decade the number of coeeshops
has declined substantially. In the four big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
Utrecht and The Hague) the drop from 2000 to 2009 was 74, in the rest of
the Netherlands 73 coeeshops ceased to exist. In 2009 in 101 of the Dutch
municipalities out of the total of 441 municipalities there were one or more
coeeshops.
The reduction of the number of coeeshops has to do with closings near
schools and a more strict policy against coeeshops that did not stick to the
rules and regulations. In Amsterdam for example the number of coeeshops
went down with 58 from 283 in 2000 to 225 in 2009. In some municipali-
ties close to the border all coeeshops were closed to avoid \drug tourism"
from Belgium, France and Germany, i.e. to ban foreign customers who buy
cannabis in the Netherlands and take this across the border. According to
Wouters, Benschop and Korf (2010) there is a shift in policy from a health
perspective to a law-and-order perspective. They nd that the presence of
coeeshops in a municipality is more likely in large municipalities and munic-
ipalities with a left-wing local government while the number of coeeshops
in a municipality is mainly determined by its population size.
6Because supply and distribution is still prohibited cannabis policy in the
Netherlands is in a twilight zone. Recently, measures have been implemented
to reduce access to coeeshops. The plan is to transform the coeeshops to
clubs for which one needs a permit to enter. The main idea of these permits
is that they will prevent tourists from entering, thus making coeeshops
local shops for local people.
4 Nature of cannabis use
4.1 Dynamics
Cannabis is dierent from regular consumption goods. The use of cannabis
is widespread but many individuals only use for a short period. Others
use it on a regular basis but are still recreational users for whom cannabis
use is comparable to drinking a beer every now and then. The nature and
variation in cannabis use are determined by the dynamics of cannabis use.
The decision to start using a particular drug may be driven by experimen-
tation. If individuals do not have information about their addictive nature
the only way to learn about it is to experiment with drugs (Orphanides and
Zervos, 1995). In deciding to do so, individuals balance the instant pleasure
derived from experimentation with drugs against the probabilistic disutility
that they may get addicted to the drug. If individuals nd out too late that
they have an addictive personality with respect to a particular drug they
will stay on. Alternatively, initiation of drug use may be driven by curiosity
which could explain the high quit rate which is often observed right after
the initiation.
Figure 2 shows typical patterns in the dynamics of cannabis use derived
from a sample of Amsterdam cannabis users (Van Ours, 2006). The top-left
graph shows that some youngsters start using cannabis between age 15 and
25, with clear peaks at age 16, 18 and 20. If they have not done so before age
25 they are very unlikely to do this later on in life. The top-right graph shows
the cumulative starting probability, which increases between age 15 and 25
to almost stay at at later ages at a level between 50 and 60 percent. The
bottom-left graph shows that about 20 percent of the cannabis users stop
7using within a year after they started. The bottom-right graph shows that
many consumers stop using after a couple of years, but even 20 years after
they started between 30 and 40 percent are still using cannabis.3 Based on
these dynamics three groups of individuals can be distinguished, abstainers,
experimentalists and persistent users some of whom are recreational users
while others are addicts.
4.2 Price sensitivity
When considering price eects of legalization, the dynamics of cannabis use
are also important. It is dicult to predict what will happen if such an
unprecedented policy change as legalization of cannabis is introduced. Le-
galization will aect cannabis use mainly - though not exclusively - through
the change in price which in itself will depend on one of the legalization
design choices, the level of taxes. However, there is hardly any study on the
relationship between cannabis price and dynamics in use. A study based on
Australian data shows that a lower price lowers the age of initiation but has
no eect on the duration of cannabis use (Van Ours and Williams, 2007). It
is also not immediately clear how the intensity of cannabis use will change.
It could be that a price drop only aects the extensive margin, i.e. attracts
casual users without increasing frequent use. It could also be that a price
reduction does not aect the overall use but does aect the frequent use.
The eects of a cannabis price drop are likely to be strongest for youngsters.
For the purpose of illustration Figure 3 shows the association between
cannabis price and cannabis use of American youngsters over the period
1991-2007. In the period 1991 to 1997 there was a drop in real cannabis
prices in the U.S. of almost 60% while between 1997 and 2007 the cannabis
price increased with 150%. These price uctuations were accompanied by
changes in ever use between 30 and 45% and changes in last 30 days use
between 15 to 25%. Although the plots in Figure 3 cannot be interpreted as
causal they do suggest that both intensive and extensive margin of cannabis
use will be aected by legalization.
The price eects of legalization are unclear. Pacula (2010) argues that
3The patterns in Figure 2 are not typical for the Amsterdam but can be found in other
countries too.
8legalization might cause a drop in cannabis price of 75 percent. Although
this is a lot it is within the range of actual price changes in the U.S. in
the past decades. The price drop caused by legalization would mean no
more than a return to mid-1990s prices. Nevertheless, both extensive and
intensive margin of cannabis use seem to be aected.
5 Health eects of cannabis use
People mainly worry about the health eects of cannabis use.4 Nevertheless,
in the grand scheme of risky health behaviors cannabis use has a modest
contribution (Cawley and Ruhm, 2011).
From a meta-analysis, Degenhardt et al. (2003) conclude that there
seems to be a modest but signicant association between heavy use of
cannabis and later depression. In their overview study, Arseneault et al.
(2004) conclude that rates of cannabis use are approximately twice as high
among people with schizophrenia as among the general population. Hall and
Degenhardt (2009) argue that previous research on the relationship between
mental health and illicit substance use, comes almost entirely from epidemi-
ology. The results from this research are mixed, with some papers reporting
a positive association between cannabis use and mental health problems and
others reporting no association. Discussing a variety of papers Werb et al.
(2010) conclude that the research to date is insucient to conclusively claim
that the association between cannabis use and psychosis is causal in nature.
In examining the relationship between mental health and cannabis use,
the literature cited above has attempted to identify the causal eect of
cannabis use by controlling for observed factors that may be a source of
confounding. However, as noted by Pudney (2010), the potential for un-
observed common confounding factors makes inference regarding the causal
impact of cannabis use dicult. Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that
there is a negative causal eect of cannabis use on health (Van Ours and
4Other worries concern the relationship between cannabis use and crime. Little is
known but the cannabis induced crime by users seems to be limited. Organized crime
is heavily involved in supplying cannabis use. Furthermore, there is a discussion about
whether cannabis use induces the use of hard drugs. This stepping stone eect seems to
be absent or small (Van Ours, 2003).
9Williams, 2011a and 2011b).
All of the linkages to assess the health eects of legalization have one
element in common: uncertainty. Therefore, opinions of individuals who
have had personal experience with cannabis use may be helpful. From an
analysis of Australian data it appears that past cannabis users are more
in favor of legalization than non-users. Apparently for individuals with
personal experience the personal benets of legalization are more important
than the personal costs (Williams et al. 2011).
6 Discussion
Caulkins et al. (2011) argue that prohibition of rarely used substances is
easier to implement than prohibition of widely used drugs. This also applies
in reverse. Legalization of a frequently used drug such as cannabis will have
smaller eects on use than legalizing a less frequently used drug such as
cocaine. The discussion about legalization of cannabis is hampered because
even simple eects are not clear in terms of their magnitude. Most likely
cannabis prices will go down and cannabis use will go up. But whether
this will induce negative health eects depends on whether the increase in
use will be at the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin. Crimi-
nal activities, predominantly those by suppliers, will be reduced. Whether
legalization benets outweigh legalization cost will also depend on design
choices.
There are many relationships about which researchers are uncertain, de-
bating whether they are causal or mere associations. As long as nowhere
in the world cannabis is legalized it is dicult to get any clear idea about
the consequences of legalization (Pudney, 2010). Removing the veil of ig-
norance that surrounds the legalization debate requires a lot of additional
research eort. However, researchers rarely agree and even if they would
agree it is doubtful whether that would convince politicians to go ahead
with cannabis legalization. Doing further research and hoping that an ev-
idence based cannabis policy will emerge is wishful thinking. Rather than
muddling through for several decades it would be wise to start moving on
the long and winding road to cannabis legalization.
10The health eects of cannabis use should not be ignored. Clearly, it is
healthier not to use cannabis at all. Nevertheless, the health eects should
not be exaggerated either. If alcohol use and smoking cigarettes are ac-
cepted albeit under restrictions so should cannabis use be. There are clear
advantages of legalization. Legalization would make life more comfortable
for cannabis users, remove criminal organizations from the scene, allow for
the possibility of quality control, provide governments with tax revenues and
make it possible for researchers to collect empirical evidence. In short, it is
time for politicians to walk down the legalization road \to boldly go where
no man has gone before".
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12Table 1: Cannabis use; various countries (percentages)
Population Ever Last year Last month
Country Year (age) use use use
Australia 2007  14 34 9 5
Denmark 2008 16-64 39 6 2
England & Wales 2008-09 16-59 31 8 5
France 2005 15-64 31 9 5
Germany 2006 18-64 23 5 2
Italy 2008 15-64 32 14 7
Netherlands 2009 15-64 26 7 4
Spain 2007-08 15-64 27 10 7
Sweden 2008 15-64 21 1 1
United States 2009  12 42 11 7
Source: Van Laar (2011)
13Figure 1: Coeeshops in the Netherlands; 4 big cities and the rest of the
Netherlands; 2000{2009





















Source: Bieleman and Nijkamp (2010)
14Figure 2: Dynamics in cannabis use in Amsterdam
a. Starting rates by age





















































































b. Quit rates by duration of use





















































































Source: Van Ours (2006) { based on surveys in 1994, 1997 and 2001.
15Figure 3: The association between cannabis prices and cannabis use of
youngsters; United States, 1991{2007
a. Ever use of cannabis



































b. Cannabis use last 30 days








































Source: Cannabis use among 9th to 12th graders: Youth Risk Behavior
Survey; median cannabis price in constant 2007 dollars per gram for small
quantities (less than 10 grams): Fries et al. (2008).
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